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segunda-feira, 29 de dezembro de 2008

DCNS and Odebrecht awarded to build conventional-propulsion submarines for Brazilian Navy

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DCNS and Odebrecht awarded to build conventional-propulsion submarines for Brazilian Navy

16:14 GMT, December 26, 2008 DCNS has been awarded a major contract by the Brazilian Navy. The customer has entrusted DCNS with the design and construction of four Scorpene conventional-propulsion submarines under a technology transfer agreement, the technical assistance for the design and construction of the non-nuclear part of the first Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine, and the support services for the construction of a naval base and a shipyard in Brazil. Regarding the nuclear submarine, the technical assistance provided by DCNS will be related to the non-nuclear part of the submarine, the Brazilian Navy being fully responsible for the nuclear plant.

The contract is part of a vast plan to renew and modernise the Brazilian Navy’s submarine fleet. It is also in line with the strategic cooperation agreement in defence signed in Rio de Janeiro today by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The contract will come into force following a comprehensive approval process in Brazil.

DCNS Chairman & CEO Jean-Marie Poimbœuf commented: “We welcome the decision by Brazil’s highest authorities in favour of DCNS and our Brazilian partner, the Odebrecht Group. This success confirms our capabilities as an overall prime contractor, as well as our technological and competitive standing on the international market. It also confirms our ability to establish partnerships to handle in-country project work, just as we have done in other countries around the world.”

DCNS will act as prime contractor for four conventional-propulsion submarines to be built by the Joint Venture that will be set up by DCNS and Brazilian partner Odebrecht. The submarines will be designed in cooperation with Brazilian teams under DCNS design authority to meet the Brazilian Navy’s specific needs: They will be ideally suited to the protection and defence of the country’s 8,500-kilometre coast. The first submarine is scheduled to enter active service in 2015.

DCNS will produce key advanced-technology equipment in its own plants.

DCNS will provide design assistance – under the Brazilian Navy’s design authority - for the non-nuclear part of the Navy’s first nuclear submarine, which will be built by the Joint Venture to be set up by DCNS and Odebrecht.

DCNS will provide prime contractor assistance to Odebrecht for the construction of the naval shipyard that will build the five submarines covered by today’s contract, as well as a naval base for the Brazilian Navy.

The strategic contract between Brazil and France covers also the development and the construction of a single nuclear-powered submarine.

domingo, 21 de dezembro de 2008

SUBMARINO SCORPÈNE: A POSIÇÃO DA MARINHA

SUBMARINO SCORPÈNE: A POSIÇÃO DA MARINHA

Submarinos na estratégia naval brasileira

Desde a década de 1970, levando em conta a vastidão do Atlântico Sul, natural teatro de nossas operações navais, e a magnitude de nossos interesses no mar, a Marinha do Brasil (MB) constatou, desde logo, que, no que tangia a submarinos, a posse de convencionais não era bastante. Para o cumprimento de sua missão constitucional de defender a soberania, integridade territorial e interesses marítimos do País, tornava-se mister dispor, também, de submarinos nucleares em seu inventário de meios. Aqueles, em face de suas peculiaridades, para emprego preponderante em áreas litorâneas, em zonas de patrulha limitadas. Estes, graças à excepcional mobilidade, para a garantia da defesa avançada da fronteira marítima mais distante.

No presente momento, encontram-se em fase de negociações, a fabricação no Brasil de submarinos convencionais, e a do primeiro com propulsão nuclear, o que se constitui na maior prioridade do Programa de Reaparelhamento da Marinha.

Sobre esse assunto foi criada, no dia 26 de setembro, último passado, a Coordenadoria-Geral do Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarino com Propulsão Nuclear (COGESN), dentro da estrutura organizacional da Diretoria Geral do Material da Marinha. Essa Coordenadoria tem as atribuições de gerenciar o projeto e a construção do estaleiro dedicado aos submarinos e de sua base; de gerenciar o projeto de construção do submarino com propulsão nuclear; e de gerenciar o projeto de detalhamento do submarino convencional a ser adquirido pela MB.

A COGESN foi criada pelo Comando da Marinha como forma de proporcionar uma melhor integração e sinergia entre todas as Organizações da Marinha, com foco no desenvolvimento de um submarino com propulsão nuclear. Essa criação tornou-se necessária, na medida em que, com a nova visão governamental no que tange à área nuclear e, em particular, à Defesa e à Segurança Nacionais, foram criadas condições para que a Marinha pudesse, mediante nova abordagem, levar adiante um empreendimento até aqui mantido no limiar da sobrevivência, à custa de sacrifícios orçamentários da própria Força Naval.

Desde o final da década de 1970, a MB desenvolve, nas dependências de seu Centro Tecnológico da Marinha em São Paulo, um programa de desenvolvimento de tecnologia nuclear, visando, por um lado, o domínio do ciclo do combustível nuclear, que logrou êxito em 1982, com a divulgação do enriquecimento do urânio com tecnologia desenvolvida pela MB. Por outro, o desenvolvimento de um protótipo de reator nuclear capaz de gerar energia para fazer funcionar a planta de propulsão de um submarino nuclear. Este, ainda em desenvolvimento, com operação prevista para 2013.

Paralelamente, para capacitar-se a construir submarinos, a MB, na mesma época, cuidou de adquirir, da Alemanha, a transferência de tecnologia de construção de submarinos, empregando, para tanto, o projeto do submarino IKL-209, à época, o modelo mais vendido no mundo. Foram, assim, construídos quatro submarinos no Arsenal de Marinha do Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ), colocando a MB no limitado rol dos países construtores desses engenhos.

O que falta para alcançar as metas

As principais pendências, no que tange à capacitação do País para construir um submarino nuclear, considerando já alcançada a meta do combustível nuclear, incluem:

a) - o término da construção e a operação experimental do reator nuclear e da respectiva planta de propulsão. Com o compromisso do presente governo de aportar recursos, sua operação está prevista para 2013; e

b) - não obstante ter logrado êxito na construção de submarinos no AMRJ, falta à Marinha a capacidade de desenvolver projetos de submarinos. O caminho seguido pelas potências que produzem submarinos nucleares foi o de, a partir do pleno domínio do projeto de convencionais, evoluir, por etapas, para um submarino nuclear, cujos requisitos, em termos de tecnologia e controle de qualidade, superam em muito aqueles de um convencional. Assim, o caminho natural para o Brasil seria, da mesma forma, o de desenvolver sucessivos protótipos, até que se chegasse a um projeto razoável, para abrigar uma planta nuclear. Como não se dispõe do tempo nem dos recursos necessários para tanto, a solução delineada pela MB, no intuito de – com segurança – saltar etapas, foi a de buscar parcerias estratégicas com países detentores de tais tecnologias e que estivessem dispostos a transferi-la.

Tendo em vista, por um lado, a total exclusão tecnológica imposta pelas principais potências aos países que buscam o domínio das tecnologias nucleares, barrando-lhes o caminho, e, por outro a indispensável transição a ser feita entre os projetos de submarinos convencionais e nucleares, demandando que a associação fosse buscada com quem produz a ambos, restaram poucas opções.

No momento, apenas dois países no mundo desenvolvem e produzem, simultaneamente, ambos os tipos de submarinos, o que limitou o campo de abordagem, respectivamente, à Rússia e à França. (Só foram considerados os fabricantes tradicionais. Pouco se sabe sobre o projeto chinês e os resultados obtidos. Na verdade, também eles vivem uma fase de aprendizado).

A Rússia desenvolveu sua tecnologia nuclear e possui um projeto de submarino convencional, o Amur 1650 (imagem à esquerda), mas apresenta alguns óbices: não possui qualquer cliente no mundo ocidental, nessa área; seu projeto de submarino convencional ainda não encontrou, pelo que se conhece, algum comprador; o apoio logístico enfrenta dificuldades; e, o que a desqualifica definitivamente, não está disposta a transferir tecnologia. Só se interessa por vender submarinos, o que está muito longe das pretensões brasileiras.

A França, por outro lado, também desenvolveu sua própria tecnologia, emprega métodos e processos típicos do Ocidente e de mais fácil absorção por nossos engenheiros e técnicos, além de ser um fornecedor tradicional de material de defesa para o mundo ocidental. No momento, exporta submarinos convencionais Scorpène (ver foto ao lado) para países como o Chile, a Índia e a Malásia. Acima de tudo, está disposta a – contratualmente – transferir tecnologia de projeto de submarinos, inclusive cooperando no projeto do submarino de propulsão nuclear brasileiro, excluídos o projeto e a construção do próprio reator e seus controles, que caberiam exclusivamente à MB. É exatamente o que interessa ao Brasil.

A opção pelo Submarino Classe Scorpène

O processo de escolha do Submarino Classe Scorpène foi longo, exaustivo e criterioso, e envolveu reuniões, visitas a países possuidores de submarinos nucleares e de submarinos dessa Classe, além de análises de diversos relatórios e intensas negociações.

Assim, para se chegar à conclusão sobre o melhor projeto de um submarino convencional que atendesse a Marinha, executou-se uma extensiva pesquisa nos diversos modelos de submarinos disponíveis, junto aos países que os detém, para se conhecer as qualidades e limitações de cada um deles.

Como qualquer projeto dessa complexidade, é natural que existam vantagens e desvantagens em cada uma das opções examinadas, avaliações que foram consideradas nos citados relatórios e que serviram de base para a escolha.

Algumas características do projeto do Submarino Scorpène merecem especial destaque. Diferentemente do usual, apesar de tratar-se de um submarino convencional, seu projeto não constitui evolução de uma classe convencional anterior; pelo contrário, seu casco hidrodinâmico é derivado do submarino nuclear “Rubis/Amethyste”, mas mais compacto. Essa classe de submarinos, denominada classe Rubis (foto à direita), tem seis unidades em operação na Marinha Francesa. Além disso, emprega tecnologias usadas nos submarinos nucleares franceses, como o sistema de combate SUBTICS.

Em decorrência, dentre as vantagens que apresenta, seu projeto destaca-se por facilitar uma rápida transição para o nuclear, haja vista sua forma de casco clássica daquele tipo de submarinos, com hidrodinâmica apropriada para elevados desempenhos em velocidade e manobra

À esquerda, pode-se observar a diferença entre um casco tipicamente de nuclear - como o do Scorpène (figura ao lado, acima) – comparado com o de um convencional clássico, um IKL-209 (figura ao lado, abaixo).

Além das peculiaridades de projeto, o Scorpène tem a vantagem de empregar os mesmos sistemas (sensores, sistema de combate, armamento, sistema de controle da plataforma etc) existentes nos submarinos nucleares franceses. Ajustes de software compatibilizam as diferentes necessidades de desempenho. Do ponto de vista logístico e de atualização tecnológica constitui diferencial respeitável.

Assim, considerando a necessidade brasileira de abreviar processos, - na verdade, queimar etapas, sem jamais comprometer a segurança –, a escolha do projeto do Scorpène, para servir de base ao desenvolvimento do projeto do nosso submarino de propulsão nuclear, resulta de aprofundados estudos e amadurecido processo de tomada de decisão. No entender da Marinha, essa escolha constitui a opção de menor risco para o êxito da empreitada, de resto, um acalentado sonho da Força Naval há, já, trinta anos.

Os submarinos serão construídos no Brasil. Nesse caso, o modelo do submarino Classe Scorpène será adaptado por nossos Engenheiros Navais. O índice de nacionalização será bastante elevado, havendo em cada um mais de 36.000 itens, produzidos por mais de 30 empresas brasileiras.

O acordo com a França, país que possui grande experiência no assunto e tecnologia bastante moderna, visa abreviar as etapas da parte não nuclear do submarino de propulsão nuclear, com a transferência de tecnologias de projeto e construção. Existe também um grande interesse da Marinha em conseguir que empresas francesas transfiram a indústrias nacionais a capacidade de fabricação de importantes equipamentos, que possuem requisitos de desempenho bastante rigorosos, exigidos para a operação em condições extremamente severas, como é o caso de submarinos.

Esse convênio está em fase final de discussão, mas, ressalta-se que, nos moldes pretendidos pela Marinha, ele prevê a transferência de tecnologia para a construção de submarinos convencionais e para a parte não nuclear do submarino com propulsão nuclear. Como exemplos, podemos mencionar a estrutura do casco resistente, as condições de desempenho hidrodinâmico, os periscópios, sistemas de combate e de comunicações, o teste dos hélices em laboratórios especializados, entre outras áreas.

Considerando a garantia dada pelo Governo Francês da transferência da tecnologia e as experiências positivas observadas sobre o Submarino da Classe Scorpène, a Marinha não teve dúvida em optar por essa obtenção.

Barracuda : Le futur des sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque

Barracuda : Le futur des sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque



Malgré les difficultés budgétaires, le programme des sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque du type Barracuda a été maintenu, avec un total de six unités. L'étalement de la construction dans le temps, redouté ces derniers mois, devrait être finalement minime, c'est-à-dire de l'ordre de six mois sur l'ensemble du programme, dont le coût atteindra 7.89 milliards d'euros. Le projet de loi de finances 2009 prévoit, en outre, la commande du second SNA l'an prochain (le premier l'avait été fin 2006). En attendant, la construction du Suffren, tête de série du programme, a débuté le 19 décembre 2007 avec la découpe de la première tôle sur le site DCNS de Cherbourg. Le premier anneau est aujourd'hui achevé, alors que les études détaillées du navire se poursuivent. Pour DCNS, Barracuda est un programme majeur non seulement par son coût, mais aussi par son aspect structurant pour l'ensemble du groupe.

A Cherbourg, où travaillent 2300 salariés, les SNA représenteront plus de 50% de l'activité jusqu'au début des années 2020. L'établissement d'Indret, près de Nantes, qui emploie près 1000 personnes pour la conception et la réalisation des appareils propulsifs, est le deuxième grand bénéficiaire de ce contrat, qui représente 40% de l'activité dès la fin 2008. D'autres sites de DCNS sont également associés au projet, comme Ruelle, près d'Angoulême, pour les tubes et les systèmes de manutention de torpilles, ainsi que les lignes d'arbres et les consoles des systèmes de conduite. Enfin, plus discret, Areva TA, ex-Technicatome, maître d'oeuvre de la chaufferie nucléaire, engrangera 15% du contrat. L'organisation industrielle de ce programme consiste en une co-maîtrise d'ouvrage entre la DGA et le Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) et une co-traitance conjointe mais non solidaire entre DCN et Areva TA, l'ex-Direction des Constructions Navales étant maître d'oeuvre d'ensemble et architecte d'ensemble.
Côté livraisons, le Suffren doit être opérationnel en 2017. Le bâtiment suivant le sera deux ans et demi plus tard, les SNA 3 à 6 étant ensuite livrés tous les deux ans. Les noms retenus pour ces sous-marins sont Suffren, Duguay-Trouin, Dupetit-Thouars, Duquesne, Tourville et De Grasse.


Le Suffren rejoindra donc la Marine nationale dans neuf ans, au moment où le Rubis, premier SNA de la génération précédente, fêtera son 34ème anniversaire. Ce submersible et ses sisterships feront alors figure de vétérans, sans compter que leur maintien en service, pour compenser le glissement de leurs remplaçants, nécessitera un programme d'entretien plus poussé et un ou deux changements de coeurs nucléaires supplémentaires. Prodiges de compacités, les Rubis souffrent, aujourd'hui, d'un certain manque de place pour assurer les futures missions dévolues à la marine. La principale différence du Barracuda par rapport à ses aînés sera donc sa taille : 99.5 mètres pour 4680 tonnes en surface (5300 tonnes en plongée), contre 73.6 mètres et 2385 tonnes pour les Rubis (2670 en plongée). Cette augmentation du volume permettra de répondre aux nouvelles normes en matière de sécurité nucléaire (redondance accrue, auxiliaires et pompes supplémentaires) mais aussi d'améliorer la discrétion acoustique et de porter de 14 à 20 le nombre d'armes embarquées, tirées depuis quatre tubes de 533 mm. Avec Barracuda, le missile de croisière Scalp Naval fera sa grande arrivée dans la sous-marinade française. Outil d'action et de dissuasion manquant cruellement à la France depuis la première guerre du Golfe, en 1991, le missile de croisière offre la capacité de tir de grande précision contre des objectifs terrestres, et en toute discrétion au large d'une côte hostile. Le dérivé navalisé du Scalp (déjà en service sur avions de combat, et dont en 2009 sur le Rafale F3) atteint une portée de 1000 kilomètres et sera également installés sur les frégates multi-missions (FREMM).



Outre le Scalp Naval, les Barracuda disposeront de la future torpille lourde (FTL). Dérivée de la Black Shark vendue à l'export, la F-21 équipera également les SNA du type Rubis et les sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins (en remplacement de la F-17 Mod2). Le programme Artemis, qui porte sur le renouvellement du parc de torpilles, a été notifié en avril dernier à DCNS. D'une longueur de 6 mètres pour un diamètre de 533 mm et un poids de 1.5 tonne, la F-21 affichera des performances nettement supérieures à son aînée. Capable de plonger au-delà de 500 mètres, elle dépassera 50 noeuds et pourra atteindre une cible à 50 kilomètres. Les Barracuda mettront également en oeuvre le missile antinavire Exocet SM39 (portée de 50 km), qui doit être modernisé au standard Block2 Mod2.



Afin de répondre aux besoins de déploiement de forces spéciales à partir des sous-marins, les Barracuda pourront être équipés derrière le massif (kiosque), d'un caisson pour commandos. Utilisant le sas de secours, ce module s'assimile à un véritable compartiment supplémentaire, où les forces spéciales, au nombre de 10, pourront stocker leurs matériels et se préparer dans des conditions optimales. Cette capacité d'action et de reconnaissance est particulièrement attendue par l'état major de la marine. Le système de combat, du type SYCOBS, sera commun avec le SNLE Le Terrible, et doté d'une nouvelle architecture sonar développée par Thales (sonar de coque UMS-3000, antenne de flanc, antenne remorquée et sonar d'évitement de mines).




Innovations technologiques

Sur de nombreux points, les Barracuda reprendront des innovations éprouvées sur les Scorpène, des sous-marins à propulsion conventionnelle réalisés en coopération avec l'Espagne et destinés à l'export. Bénéficiant d'une attention toute particulière en matière de réduction des bruits rayonnés, le premier bâtiment de ce type s'est révélé extrêmement silencieux, y compris à vitesse élevée. A plus de 20 noeuds, les capacités d'écoute du Scorpène seraient encore excellentes. Pour le futur SNA français, DCNS reprendra donc certaines recettes ayant abouti à ce résultat, à commencer par les avancées réalisées en matière de tuyauterie ou de câblage. Barracuda reprendra également les progrès du Scorpène en matière d'automatisation et de réduction d'équipage (60 marins contre 70 sur les Rubis), ainsi que dans le domaine de l'ergonomie. Traditionnellement, le PC propulsion est situé à l'arrière du bâtiment, près du réacteur. Désormais, avec les progrès de l'automatisation, il peut être situé sous le PC navigation, concentrant la conduite dans une zone centrale et laissant l'arrière inhabité, sur 40% de la longueur totale. De même, le PCNO sera légèrement décalé par rapport au kiosque; un déplacement rendu possible par l'absence de périscope pénétrant. Le traditionnel puits, très encombrant, est remplacé par un système d'écrans reliés à un mât optronique fournis par Sagem Défense Sécurité.



En matière de navigation, le Barracuda sera le premier submersible français à être doté de barres de plongée en forme de croix de Saint-André, une disposition permettant d'améliorer la manoeuvrabilité. Enfin, le submersible répondra à la réglementation environnementale MARPOL, un système de retraitement permettant de conserver à bord l'ensemble des déchets.




Des technologies spatiales pour le traitement de l'air

Elément fondamental du sous-marin, l'usine Elimination Des Polluants (EDP) est chargée d'assurer la qualité de l'air ambiant à bord. La réalisation de l'EDP a été confiée à une division allemande d'Astrium Space Transportation, filiale du groupe EADS. « La qualité de l'air ambiant à bord des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire est un sujet important puisque, n'ayant pas de communication avec l'atmosphère terrestre, l'air doit être assaini par des installations de régénération de l'atmosphère du bord embarquées », explique-t-on chez EADS. Ainsi, il faut éliminer le dioxyde de carbone produit par la respiration des membres d'équipage, l'hydrogène issu des batteries ainsi que divers polluants organiques générés par les équipements et la vie à bord. Pour y parvenir, DCNS, concepteur et constructeur du Barracuda, a choisi un procédé innovant, la toute dernière technologie régénératrice pour l'absorption de CO2 et l'élimination des polluants, développée à l'origine pour la station spatiale internationale. La cellule d'absorption fournie pour les Barracuda sera, ainsi, du même type que celle produite dans le cadre du programme Air Revitalization Systems (ARES). Initié par l'Agence spatiale européenne pour la station spatiale internationale (ISS), ce programme a vu le développement, par Astrium, d'un système en circuit fermé qui équipera donc les Barracuda.




Une IPER tous les 10 ans et même combustible que les centrales EDF

Au niveau de l'appareil propulsif, le Barracuda sera assez original. Jusqu'à une vitesse usuelle de patrouille, la propulsion sera assurée par deux moteurs électriques alimentés par des turboalternateurs recevant la vapeur du réacteur. En revanche, pour les vitesses de pointe, le navire utilisera un groupe turbopropulseur qui emmènera ses 5300 tonnes en plongée à plus de 25 noeuds. La chaufferie nucléaire est directement dérivée de celles embarquées sur les SNLE et le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle. Reprenant la même technologie, elle est néanmoins plus petite, offrant seulement 30% de la puissance des K 15 (50 MW au lieu de 150). Ces installations, très surveillées, ne nécessiteront un entretien courant que tous les ans et un rechargement du coeur tous les 10 ans, contre 7 ans pour les SNA actuels. La durée de vie des sous-marins étant de 30 ans, ils ne subiront donc que deux Indisponibilités Périodiques pour Entretien et Réparations (IPER) au cours de leur service actif. En outre, l'enrichissement des coeurs n'aura plus besoins de passer par une filière militaire mais sera traité commercialement, le combustible prévu pour les SNA de nouvelle génération étant identique à celui des centrales nucléaires d'EDF.

end


quinta-feira, 4 de dezembro de 2008

The First Soviet Giants

Russian Submarines - The First Soviet Giants

Submarine | Cold War | Russia/Soviet | Submarine and Undersea Postings
The First Soviet Giants
By Norman Polmar
From the early 1940s to the ultimate collapse of the USSR, the Soviet Navy pushed its submarine design bureaus to develop submarines specifically for troop and cargo transport. While many of these "submarine LST" concepts were not pursued, the effort offers a fascinating look at the technical challenges and strategic thought inherent in modern submarine design.

Early in World War II the Soviet Navy occasionally employed submarines as transports for small numbers of people, usually saboteurs and "agents," and limited cargo. This situation changed when German forces began the siege of the Crimean port of Sevastopol. When Soviet defenses collapsed in the Crimea in the fall of 1941, about 110,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines remained in the beleaguered port. Soviet ships and submarines, running a gauntlet of bombs and shells, brought men, munitions, and supplies into the city.

Heavy losses in surface ships led the commander of the Black Sea Fleet in April 1942 to order submarines to deliver munitions and food to Sevastopol, and to evacuate wounded troops as well as the remaining women and children. The largest available Soviet submarines of the Series XIII (L class) could carry up to 95 tons of cargo, while the smaller units delivered far less. Not only was every available space within the submarines used for cargo (including containers of gasoline), but cargo was loaded into torpedo tubes and mine chutes. Some 80 runs were made into Sevastopol by 27 submarines. They delivered 4,000 tons of supplies and munitions to Sevastopol's defenders and evacuated more than 1,300 persons. (Sevastopol fell on 3 July 1942 after a siege of 250 days.)

Based on the Sevastopol experience, the Soviet Navy's high command initiated an urgent program to build transport submarines. First, an effort was undertaken to design submarine barges for transporting cargo - solid and liquid - that could be towed by standard submarines or a specialized submarine tug (Project 605). It was envisioned that these underwater barges could be built rapidly in large numbers. According to the official Soviet submarine design history, from the beginning of the project the major complexity was not with the underwater barge itself, but with towing it by a submarine. The Navy was forced to cancel the project because of this problem.

A Tactical-Technical Elements (TTE) requirement for a small cargo submarine was issued by the Navy's shipbuilding office in July 1942, eventually designated Project 607. This was to be a submarine with a capacity of 250 to 300 tons of solid cargo not larger than 21-inch torpedoes, and also 110 tons of gasoline in four ballast tanks. Two folding cargo cranes would be fitted. The engineering plant was diesel-electric, with a single propeller shaft. No torpedo tubes would be provided, although two small deck guns were to be mounted. These cargo submarines were to use the same equipment and fittings as the small submarines of the earlier VI and VI-bis series (202 tons submerged). This approach would simplify the design and construction of the submarines, which could be built at inland shipyards.

By April 1943, blueprints were being issued. But by that time the general military situation had changed in favor of the Soviets, and the need for underwater transports disappeared; Project 607 was canceled. However, no technical or operational problems had been envisioned in the design.

While the Soviet Union built no Project 607 submarines, the concept of cargo-transport submarines continued to occupy the thoughts of Soviet submarine designers into the post-World War II era. The Soviets may also have considered ocean-going cargo submarines in this same period. According to the memoirs of the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Admiral William H. Standley, while discussing with Josef Stalin the problems of shipping war materiél to Russia, Stalin asked:

Why don't you build cargo submarines? Cargo submarines could cross the ocean without interference from Nazi submarines and could deliver their supplies directly to our own ports without danger of being sunk.

Admiral Stanley responded that he was "sure that the question of building cargo submarines has received consideration in my country." Stalin replied, "I'm having the question of cargo submarines investigated over here."

In 1948 the design bureau TsKB-18 (later Rubin) developed a draft design for Project 621 - a landing ship-transport submarine to carry out landings behind enemy lines. This was to be a large submarine with a surface displacement of some 5,950 tons. This underwater giant - with two vehicle decks - was to carry a full infantry battalion of 745 troops plus 10 T-34 tanks, 12 trucks, 12 towed cannon, and 3 La-5 fighter aircraft. The troops and vehicles would be unloaded over a bow ramp; the aircraft would be catapulted, with the launching device fitted into the deck forward of the aircraft hangar. Both conventional diesel-electric and steam-gas turbine (closed-cycle) powerplants for both surface and submerged operation were considered for Project 621.

TsKB-18 also developed the draft for Project 626, a smaller landing ship-transport ship intended for Arctic operations. The ship would have had a surface displacement of some 3,480 tons and was intended to carry 165 troops and 330 tons of fuel or four T-34 tanks for transfer ashore.

Simultaneously, interest in specialized mine-laying submarines was renewed. In 1956, the Soviet Navy's leadership endorsed a TTE for a large minelayer capable of carrying up to 100 of the new PLT-6 mines and transporting 160 tons of aviation fuel (gasoline or kerosene) in fuel-ballast tanks. This was Project 632 at TsKB-18.

Project 621. Caption follows.
Image of project 621. Caption follows.
Graphic courtesy of A.D. Baker III, from Cold War Submarines
The Soviet's Project 621 was designed as a landing ship-transport submarine that could carry out landings behind enemy lines. This underwater giant had two vehicle decks, and was designed to carry a full infantry battalion of 745 troops plus 10 T-34 tanks, 12 trucks, 12 towed cannon, and three La-5 fighter aircraft.

Preliminary designs addressed carrying mines both "wet" and "dry" (i.e., within the pressure hull). Soon the heavy workload at TsKB-18 led to the transfer of design work on Project 632 - estimated to be 33 percent complete at the time - to TsKB-16 (later Volna/Malachite). The design was completed in two variants - with wet storage for 90 mines or dry storage for 88 mines. A combined wet/dry configuration could carry 110 mines. A further variant of Project 632 showed a small increase in dimensions that would permit 100 troops to be carried in the mine spaces, with the mine-laying gear designed to be removable. The latter feature was a consequence of the Sevastopol experience, which suggested that these and other large submarines should also be able to transport aviation fuels and to be reconfigurable at naval bases to transport combat troops or wounded (with medical attendants) in place of mines.

Project 632 was approved for construction in February 1958. Significantly, in October 1958, the design for a nuclear-propelled variant of the minelayer was also approved - Project 632M, employing a small O-153 reactor plant. This ship would have been some 100 to 200 tons heavier than the basic 632 design. The nuclear variant would have a submerged cruising range estimated at 20,000 nm compared to 600 to 700 nm for the conventional propulsion plant. But when the Central Committee and Council of Ministers approved the seven-year shipbuilding program in December 1958, the Project 632 submarine was missing.

In its place, a replenishment submarine was developed beginning in 1958 that would have a secondary mine-laying capability - Project 648. Designed at TsKB-16, the craft's primary mission requirement would be to replenish and re-arm submarines attacking Allied merchant shipping. Project 648 was to carry missiles (ten P-5/P-6 [NATO SS-N-3 Shaddock]) or torpedoes (40 21-inch and 20 15.75-inch) plus 34 tons of food (estimated to feed 100 personnel for 90 days), 60 tons of potable water, and 1,000 tons of diesel fuel (or the equivalent in aviation fuels).

The weapons and stores were to be trans- ferred at sea to submarines, a considerable challenge, especially with respect to the cruise missiles. Diesel fuel was to be transferred to a submarine while both were submerged. Aviation fuel would be carried for transfer to seaplanes in remote operating areas. Again, the Sevastopol experience led to the TTE including a capability to transport 120 troops and their weapons, or to evacuate 100 wounded personnel.

Meanwhile, the design for Project 648 had been approved on 10 July 1958. Because of the termination of Project 632, the new submarine was to carry up to 98 mines in place of replenishment stores. Work on Project 648 began at the Severodvinsk shipyard in the Arctic, and a section of the submarine's hull was fabricated and specialized replenishment equipment and systems installed. The project was complex and, according to Russian historians, "As it was more profitable to construct the large-series orders for atomic submarines, the shipyard's director, Ye.P. Yegorov, tried in every possible way to shift construction of the transport-minelayer submarine to another yard or shut down the project overall."

Project 664. Caption follows.
Image of project 664. Caption follows.
The design for Project 664 combined the characteristics of a "submarine LST" with a replenishment submarine - and it would have nuclear propulsion. This large submarine would carry 20 cruise missiles or 80 21-inch torpedoes, or 160 15.75-inch torpedoes for transfer to combat submarines. Liquid cargo would include 1,000 tons of diesel oil or aviation fuel, plus 60 tons of lubricating oil, 75 tons of potable water, and 31 tons of food. In the LST role, the submarine would carry 350 troops, although up to 500 could be carried for a five-day transit.
Project 748. Caption follows.
Image of project 748. Caption follows.
Graphic courtesy of A.D. Baker III, from Cold War Submarines
Six variants of the Soviet's diesel-electric submarine LST design - Project 748 - were developed, with surface displacements from 8,000 to 11,000 tons. Most variants had three separate, cylindrical pressure hulls side-by-side, encased in a single outer hull. This large submarine could carry up to 20 amphibious tanks and BTR-60P armored personnel carriers, and up to 1,200 troops. In addition to a torpedo armament of four bow 21-inch torpedo tubes with 18 to 20 torpedoes, the submarine was to be fitted with anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. Graphic courtesy of A.D. Baker III, from Cold War Submarines.

The difficulties in replenishing submarines at sea and interest in nuclear propulsion for a replenishment submarine led to cancellation of Project 648 in June 1961. There already was a preliminary design for Project 648M in which three of the ship's silver-zinc batteries and two diesel engines would be replaced by two small O-153 nuclear plants of 6,000 horsepower each. It was estimated that the nuclear capability would increase submerged endurance from the 600 hours of diesel-electric propulsion to 1,900 hours.

The design was presented to the Navy and shipbuilding committee, but this modification of the original Project 648 design was already being overtaken by the more ambitious Project 664 submarine. Project 664 combined the characteristics of a "submarine LST" with a replenishment submarine and would have nuclear propulsion. Design work began in 1960 at TsKB-16. This would be a larger submarine, with a surface displacement of 10,150 tons, and would carry 20 cruise missiles or 80 21-inch torpedoes, or 160 15.75-inch torpedoes for transfer to combat submarines. Liquid cargo would include 1,000 tons of diesel oil or aviation fuel, plus 60 tons of lubricating oil, 75 tons of potable water, and 31 tons of food. In the LST role, the submarine would carry 350 troops, although up to 500 could be carried for a five-day transit.

There obviously was interest in replenish- ment submarines at the highest levels of the Soviet Navy. A 1961 issue of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), the senior (classified) Soviet military journal, contained an article by Admiral Yuri Panteleyev looking at future submarine operations. Among the technical problems he looked to see resolved was creating "a class of special submarine tankers and submarine transports for the shipment of combat supplies, equipment, and contingents of personnel." Panteleyev also called for "... a system for all types of underwater supply, for submarines lying on the bottom at points of dispersal and at definite depths and not moving."

Construction of Project 664 began at Severodvinsk in 1964. But soon it was determined that combining three missions - replenishment, transport, and mine-laying - in a single hull caused major complications, even in a nuclear-powered submarine. Both range and operating depth were reduced. In May 1965 all work on the lead submarine was halted. The proposal was made to transfer the project to a Leningrad shipyard to make room at Severodvinsk for accelerated construction of Project 667A/Yankee SSBNs, but the project was halted completely.

Accordingly, in August 1965 TsKB-16 was directed to respond to the TTE for a large diesel-electric submarine LST - Project 748. The design bureau, realizing the limitations of conventional propulsion for this submarine's missions, additionally initiated nuclear-propelled variants.

Six variants of Project 748 were developed with surface displacements from 8,000 to 11,000 tons. Most variants had three separate, cylindrical pressure hulls side-by-side, encased in a single outer hull. The first variant met the basic TTE; the second variant carried a larger number of PT-76 amphibious tanks; the third variant had VAU-6 auxiliary nuclear power plants; the fourth variant had two OK-300 reactor plants generating 30,000 horsepower; the fifth variant had the VAU-6 system with a single pressure hull; and in the sixth variant the OK-300 plant was replaced by four VAU-6 units.

This large submarine could carry up to 20 amphibious tanks and BTR-60P armored personnel carriers, and up to 470 troops. In addition to a torpedo armament of four bow 21-inch torpedo tubes with 18 to 20 torpedoes, the submarine was to be fitted with anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. And, of course, the submarine could serve as a minelayer.

TsKB-16 recommended proceeding with the fourth (nuclear-propelled) variant. Still, construction was not initiated because the Navy, Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, and General Staff of the Armed Forces ordered a review of the features of Projects 632, 648, 664, and 748 in an effort to develop a "ubiquitous" or all-capable nuclear submarine. TsKB-16 (now named Volna) was directed to develop a preliminary design for the submarine - Project 717. The TTE called for the clandestine delivery of up to 800 marines and four armored vehicles; the transport of arms, munitions, fuel, and provisions, including up to 20 amphibious tanks and personnel carriers; and the evacuation of troops and wounded, as well minelaying. This was to be the world's largest submarine designed to that time, with a surface displacement of more than 17,600 tons and nuclear propulsion.

The preliminary design effort was completed early in 1969. In July the Navy and the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry added to the TTE the requirement for "the rescue of the crews of sunken submarines with the aid of rescue apparatus." This change led to revised specifications, which were not formally approved until February 1970. Completion of the revised contract design for Project 717 was delayed until October 1971.

The Severodvinsk shipyard made prepara- tions for constructing five submarines to this design. Full-scale mockups were made of the control room, cargo spaces, and other portions of the submarine. However, this project, too, was stillborn when in the late 1970s, the available building ways at Severodvinsk were needed for the construction of nuclear submarines, especially Project 941/Typhoon SSBNs that were being developed as a counter to the U.S. TRIDENT program, i.e., the USS Ohio (SSBN-726) class.

Image of a preliminary sketch of  a submarine LST. Caption follows.
American Design Efforts. The U.S. Navy also undertook preliminary sketches of submarine LSTs, but never pursued the concept to the extent of the Soviet design efforts. This is artist Frank Tinsley's impression of a submarine LST produced in the 1950s for Mechanix Illustrated magazine and presented to the Navy Department. This was a 10,000-ton submarine, 720 feet long, with a beam of 124 feet that could carry 2,240 Marines, landing them by "amphibious flying platforms" that could move at 100 mph.

Thus ended the design of large minelaying/ transport/replenishment submarines in the Soviet Union. But there still was some interest in submarine tankers. In the 1960s TsKB-57 undertook the design of a large submarine tanker, Project 681, intended primarily for commercial operation. With two VM-4 nuclear reactor plants, the submarine would have a surface displacement of 24,750 tons. Subsequently, TsKB-16 began design of another nuclear-propelled submarine tanker in 1973, Project 927, but neither of these projects was pursued.

There was yet again interest in submarine tankers - and container submarines - in Russia in the 1990s. The Malachite bureau (formerly TsKB-16/143) put forward preliminary designs for a submarine capable of transporting petroleum or freight containers, especially in the Arctic region. Envisioning under-ice navigation between European and Asian ports, and possibly northern Canada, the Malachite designers noted, "Given equal cargo capacity, the efficiency of an underwater container ship is considerably higher, for example, than that of an icebreaker transport ship of the Norilsk type. The underwater tanker is competitive."

Malachite proposed tankers and container variants of the same basic nuclear submarine design employing an elliptical cross-section. The tanker variant would transport almost 30,000 tons of petroleum, which could be loaded and discharged from surface or underwater terminals. The underwater container carrier could transport 912 standard (20-foot) freight containers, loaded through a series of hatches. It was estimated to take 30 working hours to load or unload a full shipload. Large cargo hatches and an internal container-moving scheme would facilitate those operations. A single-reactor, single-shaft propulsion plant was proposed with three diesel generators for maneuvering in harbor and for ship electrical needs. Two of the diesel generators would be fitted to work as closed-cycle/Air Independent Pro-pulsion (AIP) systems for emergency under-ice operation. Thirty tons of oxygen was to be carried to provide an AIP endurance of 20 hours at a speed of seven or eight knots.

No detailed design or procurement followed as Russia fell into financial extremis during the post-Soviet era.

Noted U.S. naval authority Norman Polmar is the author of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet and - with Thomas B. Allen - Rickover: Controversy and Genius. The above article was adopted from the forthcoming book Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines (Brassey's, 2002).

Clearly, the Mumbai attack involved extensive preoperational surveillance

From the New York Landmarks Plot to the Mumbai Attack

December 3, 2008
Global Security and Intelligence Report

By Fred Burton and Ben West

On the surface, last week’s attack on Mumbai was remarkable for its execution and apparently unconventional tactics. But when compared to a plot uncovered 15 years ago that targeted prominent hotels in Manhattan, it becomes apparent that the Mumbai attack was not so original after all.

The 1993 New York Landmarks Plot

In July 1993, U.S. counterterrorism agents arrested eight individuals later convicted of plotting an elaborate, multistage attack on key sites in Manhattan. The militants, who were linked to Osama bin Laden’s then-relatively new group, al Qaeda, planned to storm the island armed with automatic rifles, grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In multiple raids on key targets combined with diversionary attacks, they aimed to kill as many people as possible.

The planned attack, which came to be known as the “Landmarks” plot, called for several tactical teams to raid sites such as the Waldorf-Astoria, St. Regis and U.N. Plaza hotels, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and a midtown Manhattan waterfront heliport servicing business executives and VIPs traveling from lower Manhattan to various New York-area airports. The militants carried out extensive surveillance both inside and outside the target hotels using human probes, hand-drawn maps and video surveillance. Detailed notes were taken on the layout and design of the buildings, with stairwells, ballrooms, security cameras and personnel all reconnoitered.

The attackers intended to infiltrate the hotels and disguise themselves as kitchen employees. On the day of the attack, one attack team planned to use stolen delivery vans to get close to the hotels, at which point heavily armed, small-cell commando teams would deploy from the rear of the van. Stationary operatives would use hand grenades to create diversions while attack teams would rake hotel guests with automatic weapons. The attackers planned to carry gas masks and use tear gas in hotel ballrooms to gain an advantage over any security they might come up against. They planned to attack at night, when the level of protection would be lower.

The targeted hotels host some of the most prestigious guests in Manhattan. These could have included diplomats like the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who traditionally keeps an apartment in the Waldorf-Astoria, or even the U.S. secretary of state, who is known to stay at the Waldorf during U.N. sessions. They also host various business leaders. If successful, the attackers doubtless would have killed many high-profile individuals key to New York’s stature as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.

Meanwhile, the plots to detonate explosives in the Lincoln and Holland tunnels would have blocked critical transportation infrastructure, sowing chaos in the city as key escape routes were closed off. And VIPs seeking to escape the city via the midtown heliport would have been thwarted by the attack planned for that location. In fact, the heliport attack was planned to be carried out using watercraft, which also could have been used to target transport ferries, further disrupting transportation in and out of Manhattan. The New York City Police Department could plausibly even have quarantined Manhattan to prevent the attackers from fleeing the city.

With the city shut down and gunmen running amok, the financial center of the United States would have been thrown into chaos and confusion until the attackers were detained or killed. The attacks thus would have undermined the security and effectiveness of New York as a center for financial and diplomatic dealings.

At the time, U.S. counterterrorism officials deemed that the attack would have had a 90 percent success rate. Disaster, then, was averted when federal agents captured the plotters planning the Landmarks attack thanks to an informant who had infiltrated the group. Along with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing just four months earlier, which killed six people but was intended to bring down both towers, the United States dodged a major bullet that could have been devastating to New York.

The Nov. 26 Mumbai Attack

A little more than fifteen years later, the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai closely followed the script of the New York plot. Militants armed with AK-47s, grenades and military-grade explosives carried out a very logistically sophisticated and coordinated attack on the financial capital of India.


Clearly, the Mumbai attack involved extensive preoperational surveillance. Attackers had maps of the targeted hotels, and according to the Indian Marine Commandos who raided the Taj Mahal hotel, the militants moved around as if they knew the hotel’s layout by heart. Advance members of the attack teams had already taken up positions in the hotels, stockpiling firearms, ammunition, grenades and food that were quickly accessed and used to maintain the attackers’ positions in the hotels. One of the attackers reportedly also had taken a job as an intern chef in the Taj Mahal hotel kitchen, so his movements raised less suspicion and he had a detailed knowledge of the entry points and corridors. For such attacks, preparedness is key, and escaping alive is a long shot. The attackers therefore must have been highly motivated and willing to die — a rare combination that requires immense amounts of training and ideological zeal.

At least two teams entered the city by watercraft, breaking up into smaller groups as they made their way to the Taj Mahal hotel, Oberoi-Trident hotel complex and Nariman (also known as Chabad) House, a Jewish center in the same area of Mumbai. These tactical teams dispersed across the city, attacking prominent sites where foreign VIPs were sure to be present. They infiltrated the hotels through back entrances and kitchens, thus enhancing the element of surprise as they opened fire on guests in the dining areas and atriums of the hotels.

Beyond killing people and holding hostages in Mumbai’s most prestigious hotels, other attack teams assaulted additional strategic sites in Mumbai, creating a sense of chaos and confusion over the whole city. Mumbai’s main train station, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, as well as Cama Hospital, offices of The Times of India newspaper, restaurants, a theater, and bars frequented by foreigners also were attacked. The attackers’ excellent coordination — the multiple attacks took place nearly simultaneously — thus ensured maximum confusion and chaos, frustrating police responses. This could explain in part why operations like those at Nariman House and the hotels lasted for more than 48 hours.

Similarities between New York and Mumbai

The similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack are quite obvious. In symbolic terms, as the Mumbai attack unfolded, many onlookers said that an attack on Mumbai is to India what an attack on New York is to Americans. In more concrete terms, the targets, methods, weapons and geography involved were similar (if not identical), and the unconventional style of the attacks points to a common author.

U.S. counterterrorism forces in 1995 detained Landmarks plot mastermind Ramzi Yousef, who remains in U.S. federal prison. But his ideas obviously did not stay behind bars. This illustrates how a plan’s initial failure does not mean the threat has been eliminated. Indeed, Stratfor observed in 2005 that the 1993 Landmarks plot (among others) should not be discounted, as al Qaeda or other terrorist groups are known to return to past targets and plot scenarios.

The similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack exist at several levels.

The first relates to the target set. Both New York and Mumbai are the respective financial centers of their countries and home to their nations’ major stock exchanges. In both cities, the planners had picked out high-profile soft targets — sites that have less security personnel and countermeasures than, say, a military installation or key government building. Softer security means gaining access to strategic assets and people is easier. Stratfor has long stressed the importance of maintaining vigilance at soft targets like hote ls that cater to international guests, as these are likely targets for militant Islamists. Both plans also involved infiltrating hotel staff and booking rooms in the hotels to gain inside information and store supplies.

The second similarity involves how both plans included peripheral targets to cause confusion and chaos and thus create a diversion from the main targets. In Mumbai, transportation infrastructure like the city’s main railway station was attacked, and militants detonated explosive devices in taxis and next to gasoline pumps. Meanwhile, roving gunmen attacked other sites around the city. In a country where coordination among first responders is already weak, the way the attackers fanned out across the city caused massive chaos and distracted security forces from the main prize: the hotels. Attacking Cama Hospital also sowed chaos, as the injured from one scene of attack became the targets of another while being rescued.

A third similarity exists in the geography of the two cities. In both plots, the use of watercraft is a distinctive tactical similarity. Watercraft gave militants access at unconventional locations where security would be more lax. Both Mumbai (a peninsula) and Manhattan (an island) offer plenty of points where militants can mount assaults from watercraft. Such an attack would not have worked in New Delhi or Bangalore; these are landlocked cities where militants would have had to enter by road, a route much more likely to encounter police patrols. Being centers of trade and surrounded by water, both Mumbai and New York have high levels of maritime traffic. This means infiltrating the area from the water would raise minimal suspicions, especially if the craft were registered locally (as was the case in the Mumbai attack). Such out-of-the box tactics take advantage of security services, which often tend to focus on established threats.

A fourth similarity lies in transportation. In addition to using watercraft, both plots involved the use of deceptive vehicles to maneuver around the city undetected. The Landmark plotters used taxis to conduct surveillance and planned on using a delivery van to approach the hotels. In Mumbai, the attackers planted bombs in taxis, and at least one group of militants hijacked a police van and used it to carry out attacks across the city. Using familiar vehicles like taxis, delivery vans or police vans to carry out surveillance or attacks reduces suspicion and increases the element of surprise, allowing militants to stay under cover until the moment of attack.

An Off-the-Shelf Plan

As indicated, the striking similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack suggest that Ramzi Yousef and other early al Qaeda operatives who helped prepare the Landmarks plot in New York authored the Mumbai plan. Considering that the militants launched their original attack from Karachi, Pakistan, and the previous involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency — which has connections with al Qaeda leaders in western Pakistan — it is very likely that al Qaeda in Pakistan at least provided the blueprints for this attack. On-the-ground operations like training, surveillance and the actual attack appear to have been carried out by the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba in connection with Indian Islamist groups.

Here we see more evidence of the existence of an ideological or strategic battle space that exists in the radical Islamist world, which has been greatly influenced by al Qaeda. Like a contingency plan that might sit on the shelf for years or decades before it is useful, terrorist plots (especially good ones) can have a long shelf life and be applied in various scenarios. In fact, plans that sit on the shelf longer might actually be more effective as security officials focus their attention on evolving threats and forget old ones.

Just because a plot has been disrupted, the threat has not been eliminated. Once terrorists happen upon a successful model, they are likely to follow that model. This can be seen in al Qaeda’s return to the World Trade Center in 2001, eight years after the initial truck bomb attacks in 1993. It can also be seen in the fact that Mumbai has been the target of multiple attacks and threats, including train bombings in 2006 that killed approximately 200 people. Though the tactics might have differed, the target set remained the same. Various parts of the attack cycle can change, but rarely does an attack occur that is completely novel.

Ultimately, the biggest difference between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack is that the Mumbai attack succeeded. The failure of the Landmarks plot probably provided key lessons to the planners of the Mumbai attack, who were able to carry out the stages of the attack without detection and with the full element of surprise. Gauging by the success of the Mumbai incident, we can expect similar strategies and tactics in future attacks.

segunda-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2008

No way to stop us, pirate leader says

From David McKenzie
CNN

NAIROBI, Kenya (CNN) -- Somalis are so desperate to survive that attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean will not stop, a pirate leader promises.

A French warship keeps guard over commerical vessels in the Gulf of Aden last week.

A French warship keeps guard over commerical vessels in the Gulf of Aden last week.

"The pirates are living between life and death," said the pirate leader, identified by only one name, Boyah. "Who can stop them? Americans and British all put together cannot do anything."

The interview with the pirate was conducted in late August by journalists employed by the Somali news organization Garowe. The complete interview was provided to CNN last week and provides a glimpse of why piracy has been so hard to control in the region.

Recorded on grainy video, the interview took place in the Somali port city of Eyl, now a center of pirate operations. Eyl is on the east coast of Somalia in the autonomous territory of Puntland. It is a largely lawless zone, considered extremely dangerous for Westerners to enter.

The Puntland government said two unidentified Western journalists were taken hostage Wednesday as they attempted to report on pirate activity.

Boyah said that the piracy began because traditional coastal fishing became difficult after foreign fishing trawlers depleted local fish stocks. Traditional fishermen started attacking the trawlers until the trawler crews fought back with heavy weapons. The fishermen then turned to softer targets. Video Watch why fishermen turned to piracy »

"We went into the deep ocean and hijacked the unarmed cargo ships," Boyah said.

"For the past three years, we have not operated near the Somali coast. We have operated at least 80 miles [out], in international waters."

When merchant shipping started avoiding the Somali coast, Boyah said, "we went to ships traveling other routes."

Over the past year, the number of pirate attacks has increased dramatically. The International Maritime Bureau cites more than 90 pirate attacks off East Africa so far in 2008. When attacks are successful, the hijacked ships are taken to Somali waters, where the ships and crew are held until a ransom is paid. See how pirate attacks have increased »

Ships recently captured include a massive Saudi supertanker laden with crude oil valued at more than $100 million and a freighter carrying Russian-built tanks.

The hijackings have been profitable. Kenya's foreign minister, Moses Wetangula, estimates the pirates have been paid more than $150 million during the past year. One pirate gang wants $2 million dollars to release a Yemeni freighter and crew seized last week.

Facing increasing disruptions through one of the busiest sea lanes in the world, several countries have sent warships to patrol the area. There have been reports of skirmishes between pirates and naval forces, but the military presence does not concern pirate leader Boyah. He boasts the pirates literally sail in a vast ocean beneath the radar of the warships. Video Watch how piracy thrives off Somalia »

"No ship has the capability to see everything," he said. "A ship can see 80 miles or so [on radar]. It cannot see us at all. No one can do anything about it."

Boyah said it is unlikely the Puntland regional government would ever crack down on piracy because government officials are involved in financing the piracy and collect a cut of the ransoms.

"They motivate us. It's their money and their weapons," Boyah said. "Thirty percent belongs to them."

The Puntland foreign minister, Ali Abdi Aware, denied government involvement with the pirates, including taking bribes. The minister cited the arrest of six pirates earlier this year as evidence it is acting to stop piracy.

Pirate Boyah said he is unimpressed with the arrests by Puntland authorities.

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"The pirates are at sea and Puntland does not approach them. The pirates are on land and Puntland does not approach them," Boyah said. "They arrest some small people and tell the world that they captured pirates, but they are liars."

While Boyah may have been outspoken about the government's ineffectiveness, he did not allow interviewers to show his face, an indication that even in this lawless country, pirates still have some fear.

On Defending Unarmed Merchant Against Pirates

On Defending Unarmed Merchant Ships Against Pirates

It seems that the piracy problem off Somalia keeps spiraling out of control. Attacks on merchant ships brought calls for the ships to take action to protect themselves. Now, the ship M/V BISCAGLIA with a security team onboard was taken after pirates persisted to finally overcome the anti-pirate measures deployed against them.

One reason why the defense of the ship failed was because the pirates were armed and the security team only had non-lethal weapons to defend the ship with. Still they managed for about 45 minutes. Why weren't they armed? It is a logistics/legal problem:
“They were unarmed. They had no other option. As far as I’m concerned they deserve a medal,” said Nick Davis, a former British Army pilot who runs AntiPiracy Maritime Security Solutions (APMSS) out of Poole, Dorset. Mr Davis said his guards were unarmed because it was almost impossible to carry firearms through Customs and on to vessels in most countries, and because ships with cargoes of chemicals or gas seldom allowed weapons on board. - Times Online (Found at EagleSpeak here)
Pirates of course don't need to concern themselves with the legalities for their weapons since they are not facing any sort of legal challenge.

Unfortunately in this case, the non-deadly LRAD system and fire hoses were not enough to prevent the pirates from boarding.

This incident did remind me of this list I made up of how to defend a ship against Greenpeace protesters
Greenpeace keeps getting away with this because ship's crews are not given the GreenLight to repel them. Here are some ways to protect the ship if you find yourself being attacked by Greenpeace: (Note: Anything you do is your responsibility, although it is Greenpeace that forces you to act.)

- Use fire hoses and fire monitors. Add Foam or soap to make everything slippery. Deliver the soap inside water balloons and then use the hoses to foam it all up.

- Use the anchor wash if there is an attempt to secure themselves to the anchor chain.

- Use paintball guns. For more effect, shoot Pepper balls.

- Have the engineers whip up a couple potato cannons. Instead of potatoes, you can try ice cubes for a shotgun effect.

- Make use of expired flares. Just don't shoot them skyward.

Originally Posted on Maritime Monday 76
Of course Somali pirates are not Greenpeace protesters, but the list above is a little better than nothing at all and sending a constant stream of material/scrap metal their way might be enough of a deterrent for them to seek a less challenging target. So thinking about this failed defense of the M/V BISCAGLIA, I came up with a couple more ways to defend against borders:
- Molatov cocktails thrown onto the deck as they come alongside

- Drop the pilot ladder into the sea with a pirate or two, three still clinging to it

- Drop twistlocks and whatever else that heavy on them

- Fabricate gravity-powered 'missiles' out of large diameter pipe that can shoot through the pirate vessel's hull with the front end cut at an angle like a hypodermic needle to hole the pirate boat. (Not too large that it is not easy to move around the deck and deploy, but large enough to fly through the hull when it hits.)


I would think that the pirates are at their most vulnerable when they are alongside trying to get onboard so this is probably where they should be hit if they cannot be kept away. They are also in a position where if they were to attempt to damage the ship they would most likely become casualties in the process as well.

The suggestions above are of increasing effectiveness as the freeboard of the vessel increases, giving gravity a greater punch as whatever is tossed over the side strikes the vessel.

Buts lets say you could get armed teams onboard merchant ships. Just how well armed should these security teams be? Technically, there are two targets. The pirate vessel itself and the pirates onboard the vessel.

This time the security team targeted the pirates. Perhaps the better move is to target the vessel with enough firepower that can disable or sink it. This probably means deployment of a heavy machine gun, such as a .50 caliber or of some sort of rocket or missile that can hole their boat with one shot. How about a couple Marines with a 40 mm grenade launcher as part of their gear?

The MGL (Multiple Grenade Launcher) is a lightweight 40 mm semi-automatic, 6-shot grenade launcher developed and manufactured in South Africa by the Milkor company (renamed Rippel Effect in 2007). The MGL was demonstrated as a concept to the South African Defence Force in 1981. The operating principle was immediately accepted and subjected to a stringent qualification program. The MGL was then officially accepted into service with the SADF as the Y2. After its introduction in 1983, the MGL was gradually adopted by the armed forces and law enforcement organizations of over 30 countries; it has since proven its effectiveness in harsh environments ranging from rain forests to deserts. Total production since 1983 has been more than 18,000 units.

The MGL is multiple-shot weapon, intended to significantly increase a small squad's firepower when compared to traditional single-shot grenade launchers like the M203. The MGL is designed to be simple, rugged and reliable. It uses the well-proven revolver principle to achieve a high rate of accurate fire which can be rapidly brought to bear on a target. A variety of rounds such as HE, HEAT, anti-riot baton, irritant or pyrotechnic can be loaded and fired at a rate of one per second; the cylinder can be loaded or unloaded rapidly to maintain a high rate of fire. Although intended primarily for offensive/defensive use with high-explosive rounds, with appropriate ammunition the launcher is suitable for anti-riot and other security operations. - Wikipedia
Using military personnel will overcome a major obstacle in the way of arming merchant ships, namely, it is damn near impossible to get armed security teams to and from these vessels since they need to be permitted entry into the country where they plan to embark the vessels they intend to protect as well as be permitted to disembark via another port/country once the ship has passed through the pirate area. There are already a number of naval vessels in the area conducting anti-pirate operations. Just have a couple stationed at the edge of the pirate areas and then have willing ships embark defensive teams onboard who can ride the vessel through the area and then be collected on the other side by another naval vessel stationed for that purpose. The team can then hitch a ride back to their ship on another cargo vessel going the other way. But this is how it would need to be done, at sea deployment, if done at all. As a bonus, the naval vessels can better be tasked for hunting the pirates down via boardings and less so on escort duty.

There is no simple answer here but surely there is more that can be done by the vessels to better prevent more ships from being taken by pirates.

Surely, the three rescued members of the security team will be able to discuss the pirate attack and how they were able to eventually defeat their defenses. This should then be shared so that protection plans can be adjusted accordingly.

Kennebec Captain's post "The (Unarmed) Defense of the Biscaglia" was the inspiration for this post.

sábado, 29 de novembro de 2008

F.Constituição na operação Bogatun 2008


Fragata "Constituição" realiza Operação BOGATUN-2008

A Fragata “Constituição” (F42) participa entre os dias 25, 26 e 27 de novembro, juntamente com navios da Marinha do Chile, da Operação "BOGATUN-2008", realizada na área marítima compreendida entre as cidades de Talcahuano e Valparaiso, no Oceano Pacífico, na costa chilena.

Participam os seguintes meios navais do Chile: Fragatas "Almirante Cochrane” e “Prat”; Submarino SSK “Carrera”; Rebocador “Galvarino” e as Aeronaves PC-7, P-3ACH e P-111, baseadas em terra.

Nesta operação, o Grupo-Tarefa brasileiro-chileno realiza diversos exercícios de Guerra Anti-Submarino; de Superfície e Antiaéreo; Operações Aéreas com helicópteros orgânicos; Tiro de Superfície sobre Alvo Rebocado; Tiro Anti-Aéreo sobre Granada Iluminativa; Transferência de Carga Leve, entre outros. A operação visa obter uma maior interoperabilidade entre as Marinhas brasileira e chilena, aumentando o nível de adestramento e aprestamento dos navios e de suas atripulações nas operações conjuntas entre países.

A participação da Marinha do Brasil na Operação “BOGATUN-2008” tem como um dos seus propósitos o intercâmbio de conhecimentos técnico-profissionais, troca de experiências profissionais e o estreitamento, cada vez maior, dos laços de amizade entre o Brasil e o Chile.

O encerramento da Operação "BOGATUN" ocorrerá com a atracação dos navios no porto de Valparaíso, ocasião em que a Fragata “Constituição” iniciará a sua participação na Exposição e Conferência Internacional Marítima e Naval para a América Latina (EXPONAVAL), que contará com a presença de Navios e Empresas de vários países como: Reino Unido, Itália, França, Holanda, Estados Unidos, México, Argentina, Peru, Canadá, África do Sul, Bélgica, Alemanha, China, entre outros.


quinta-feira, 27 de novembro de 2008

Fragata "Constituição" navega pelo Estreito de Magalhães



Fragata "Constituição" navega pelo Estreito de Magalhães para realizar a Operação "Bogatun"

A Fragata "Constituição" (F42) suspendeu de Punta Arenas com destino a Talcahuano (Chile), no dia 15 de novembro, continuando sua travessia para realizar a Operação “BOGATUN-2008”. Navegando em águas interiores, A F42 passou pelos "Canais Chilenos" e pelo "Estreito de Magalhães".

O "Estreito de Magalhães" é uma passagem navegável, situado ao sul da América do Sul, entre o continente, a "Terra do Fogo" e o "Cabo Horn", registrando-se como a maior e mais importante passagem natural entre os oceanos Atlântico e Pacífico. Antes da criação do Canal do Panamá, o "Estreito de Magalhães" era a única passagem utilizada para atravessar do Atlântico ao Pacífico evitando-se, assim, o tempestuoso "Cabo Horn".

A F42 realizará, ao todo, 90 horas de navegação pelo "Estreito de Magalhães" e pelos "Canais Chilenos". A região dos canais possui um clima instável e suscetível a constantes mudanças em poucas horas.

Durante toda a travessia, o navio foi acompanhado por dois práticos militares, oficiais da Marinha do Chile, que proveram assessoramento durante o transcurso dos estreitos, angusturas e canais.

Após a saída dos "Canais Chilenos", o navio atingirá o Oceano Pacífico e demandará o porto de Talcahuano, de onde iniciará os preparativos para realizar a Operação "BOGATUN-2008".

Fotografias são raras

As fotografias da F42 foram tiradas por meio de sobrevôo de sua aeronave orgânica ("Lynx"), quando o navio encontrava-se navegando pelos "Canais Chilenos", após ter sido obtida autorização para sobrevôo, junto à Força Aero-Tática (FAT) chilena.

As excelentes imagens e filmes feitos na ocasião podem ser consideradas raras, pelo fato de, nem sempre, as condições de tempo naquela área serem favoráveis, de forma a proporcionar a oportunidade de se navegar em um verdadeiro "espelho d´água". Os próprios Oficiais da Marinha do Chile (práticos que auxiliaram na navegação) ficaram impressionados com as fotos tiradas.

Saiba mais sobre a participação da F42 na Operação "Bogatun-2008"

quarta-feira, 26 de novembro de 2008

Marinha realiza II Seminário de Comunicação Social

Marinha realiza II Seminário de Comunicação Social

A Marinha do Brasil realiza em Brasília, entre os dias 24 e 27 de novembro, o II Seminário de Comunicação Social, com o objetivo de discutir a Comunicação Social, sua importância estratégica e perspectivas, reunindo Oficiais e Servidores Civis de diversas Organizações Militares da Marinha que atuam na área de Comunicação Social, além de representantes do Ministério da Defesa, do Exército e da Aeronáutica.

O Comandante da Marinha, Almirante-de-Esquadra Julio Soares de Moura Neto, abriu o seminário no dia 24 de novembro pela manhã. Após a abertura, o Sr. Roberto Duailib, da "Dualib, Petit, Zaragoza Porpaganda Ltda" (DPZ) proferiu palestra com o tema "A importância da Comunicação Social nos dias de hoje".

Além de visitas aos Centros de Comunicação Social das Forças Armadas, o seminário contará também com os seguintes palestrantes ao longo da semana: Sr. Ruy Flaks Schneider, Presidente da Schneider & Companhia, com a palestra "Mídias alternativas - alta eficiência e baixo custo"; Sr. Márcio Polidoro, Diretor de Comunicação Empresarial da Odebrecht S.A, com a palestra "Gerenciamento de crises"; Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Dennis Teixeira de Jesus, Capitão dos Portos da Amazônia Ocidental, com uma apresentação sobre acidentes de embarcações no Rio Amazonas; Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra Sergio Nathan Marinho Goldstein, Vice-Diretor do Centro de Comunicação Social da Marinha, com a palestra "EMA-860 - Diretriz Normativa de Comunicação Social para a Marinha"; e Sr. Guilherme Ribenboim, Presidente da Yahoo! Brasil, com a palestra "Aplicações da Internet na Comunicação Social moderna".

terça-feira, 25 de novembro de 2008

CURIOSIDADE rastreo a sospechosos que no necesita la ayuda de las operadoras

23/11/2008 | Cómo espiar usando el móvil

Miguel Angel Criado

El FBI y otras agencias de EEUU utilizan un método de rastreo a sospechosos que no necesita la ayuda de las operadoras.

Para espiar a los malos cuando usan su móvil se necesitan una orden judicial y la colaboración de las compañías telefónicas, incluso en las películas.

Sin embargo, el FBI y otras agencias de seguridad de EEUU han encontrado una manera de obviar el papeleo. Lo llaman triggerfish y, aunque no tiene una traducción fácil, sí se sabe para qué sirve: rastrear los movimientos de un sospechoso por medio de su teléfono móvil.

La localización mediante los móviles no es nueva. Si no pudieran ser ubicados, simplemente no podrían recibir o enviar llamadas. Pero esa información geográfica necesaria para la topografía de la red de telefonía móvil sólo la conocen las operadoras.

Cuando la policía quiere saber dónde está un sospechoso o a quién llama, necesita la colaboración técnica de la compañía telefónica y el visto bueno legal de un juez.

Falsa antena

El triggerfish o analizador digital es un aparato que simula ser una antena de telefonía móvil

Sin embargo, y según muestran varios documentos del Departamento de Justicia de EEUU, el FBI cuenta con una tecnología que prescinde de la intervención de las operadoras. El triggerfish o analizador digital es un aparato que simula ser una antena de telefonía móvil. Basta con estar cerca del objetivo y esperar a que descuelgue. Cuando llama, el móvil busca siempre la señal de la antena que mejor cobertura le da. Por eso, los equipos de los policías de EEUU son muy potentes, para que el terminal siempre acuda a ellos. Una vez lo hace, y sin interceptar la llamada, el analizador registra datos vitales para una investigación como son el número de teléfono, el de serie o a quién llama, entre otros.

Aunque la existencia de esta tecnología ya era sospechada y había documentación técnica en algunos foros especializados, es la primera vez que un organismo oficial de los EEUU reconoce su existencia y su uso.

Documentos oficiales

Dos organizaciones activistas de EEUU, la Unión Americana para las Libertades Civiles (ACLU) y la Fundación Fronteras Electrónicas (EFF), exigieron a comienzos de año información sobre este sistema. En aquél país, la legislación permite a los ciudadanos exigir la publicación de documentación oficial que pueda afectar a sus derechos y no comprometa la seguridad nacional.

El Departamento de Justicia de EEUU les envió este mes una serie de documentos sobre prácticas y técnicas de vigilancia policial. Aunque otras convencionales como la intervención de la línea telefónica están regladas, el rastreo de los móviles sin intervención de las operadoras no exige la autorización del juez, sólo una comunicación previa y razonada. Como se puede leer en la alerta lanzada por la ACLU en su web: "Con tecnología como esta, quién necesita la ley?"

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